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INTRODUCTION 
Thank you for including me in today’s symposium. It is an 
honor to be a part of this event and on this panel, Experiences of 
States Parties in Trying to Live Up to CEDAW’s Provisions. Today, I 
will examine the prevalence of reservations to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and how they may impact the implementation of the 
                                                     
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Associate Professor of Law, 
Thomas Jefferson School of Law; JD Yale Law School 1996. This piece is based on 
a presentation given at the Michigan State Law Review & Lori E. Talsky Center for 
Human Rights of Women and Children Symposium on Whether the U.S. Should 
Become a Party to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (Nov. 8, 2013). A special thanks to all the organizers 
and participants in the symposium; Marcia Freeman and Neil Englehart in particular 
offered helpful comments to my presentation. 
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treaty. My co-panelist, Jamil Dakwar, will specifically address the 
proposed U.S. reservations to CEDAW, should the United States 
become a party. I will look at the issue more broadly, showing how 
ratification alone should not be seen as a panacea. 
Many states have become parties to the treaty without truly 
obligating themselves to achieving the goal of equality for women. 
Rather, reservations purport to allow states to become parties in 
name only, while not requiring crucial changes in the country’s laws 
or society’s practices. 
I will briefly explain the concept of reservations under treaty 
law as applied to CEDAW. I will then examine how states use 
reservations to CEDAW for various ends. I will use Singapore to 
illustrate multiple possibilities: first, as a state that entered a broad 
reservation, showing how states may drastically limit the 
requirement to make true progress in women’s rights; second, as a 
state that partially withdrew its reservation, demonstrating the 
potential impact of pressure from the Committee on Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (the Committee) and advocacy 
groups that relied on CEDAW to push for reforms; and finally, as a 
state that nonetheless maintained a not-insignificant reservation, 
perhaps exemplifying the use of CEDAW reservations for political 
ends.1 The complex history of Singapore’s reservation practice 
allows for multiple interpretations, making it a useful example. There 
are, however, other countries that may illustrate each point in more 
significant ways. 
I. CEDAW 
CEDAW entered into force in September of 1981.2 There are 
currently 187 States parties to the treaty.3 A reservation is any 
                                                     
 1. Marsha Freeman, for example, has noted that some countries attach 
meaningful reservations in order to make political points about Islamic theocracies 
as part of internal politics. See Marsha A. Freeman, Keynote Address at the 
Michigan State Law Review Symposium on Whether the U.S. Should Become a 
Party to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (Nov. 7, 2013). 
 2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 3. Id.; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-
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statement made when ratifying a treaty that “purports to exclude or 
to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State.”4 
According to one commentator, CEDAW has been “subject to 
more reservations than any other international human rights treaty.”5 
Seventy-seven countries entered reservations upon ratification of the 
treaty.6 But the sheer number of reservations can be misleading. 
Many of the reservations are to Article 29, regarding dispute 
resolution.7 This provision specifically allows states to enter a 
reservation in order to opt out of the procedure.8 Moreover, 
CEDAW’s reputation regarding reservations may be unwarranted; 
international human rights expert Marsha Freeman points out that the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child actually has more substantive 
reservations overall than CEDAW.9 
Several countries have subsequently withdrawn reservations, in 
whole or in part. In fact, “more reservations to the Convention have 
been modified or removed than those to any other human rights 
treaty”—impacting both general reservations as well as reservations 
to specific provisions (including Article 29).10 
Nonetheless, a number of States parties maintain noteworthy 
reservations.11 It is not clear whether such reservations have an effect 
                                                                                                                
8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Participants, 
Declarations, and Reservations]. 
 4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 5. SUSAN W. TIEFENBRUN, WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS 52-53 (2012). 
 6. Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, U.N. WOMEN, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm#N20 (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2014). 
 7. See id. 
 8. CEDAW, supra note 2, at 23.  
 9. Freeman, supra note 1.  
 10. Jane Connors, Article 28, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION 
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A COMMENTARY 591 (Marsha 
A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin & Beate Rudolf eds., 2012) [hereinafter CEDAW 
COMMENTARY]. 
 11. Compare, e.g., Brazil, Declarations, Reservations and Objections to 
CEDAW, supra note 6 (expressing Brazil’s withdrawal of reservations to Article 
15(4) and Article 16(1)(a), (c), (g), and (h)), with Brunei Darussalam, Declarations, 
Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, supra note 6 (“The Government of Brunei 
Darussalam expresses its reservations regarding those provisions of the said 
Convention that may be contrary to the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam and to 
the beliefs and principles of Islam, the official religion of Brunei Darussalam and, 
without prejudice to the generality of the said reservations, expresses its reservations 
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on the human rights of women in those countries. Professor Neil 
Andrew Englehart’s review of data shows no statistically significant 
impact on rights based on reservations, even when taking the type of 
reservation into account.12 In a broader study looking at several 
human rights treaties, Todd Landman finds that countries that have 
ratified treaties more recently, third- and fourth-wave democracies, 
tend to do so with fewer reservations; but as less-established 
democracies, these states tend to have higher levels of human rights 
violations.13 Overall, there does not seem to be a significant 
correlation between the number or type of reservation and the human 
rights conditions in a country.14 Regardless of any statistically 
significant correlations, an examination of CEDAW reservations can 
be useful. It can help uncover the most controversial provisions of 
the treaty and the use of CEDAW mechanisms for internal political 
reasons. 
A. The Usual Suspects: Articles 2 and 16 
The Committee has expressed concern over many of the 
reservations, particularly those to Articles 2 and 16.15 Article 2 is 
CEDAW’s policy measures or “undertakes” provision, meaning that 
it requires states to undertake certain action.16 Specifically, Article 2 
provides: 
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, 
agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in 
their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet 
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate 
means, the practical realization of this principle; 
                                                                                                                
regarding paragraph 2 of Article 9 and paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the 
Convention.”). 
 12. Neil Andrew Englehart, Remarks at the Michigan State Law Review 
Symposium on Whether the U.S. Should Become a Party to the U.N. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Nov. 8, 2013). 
 13. TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
7, 118 (2005). 
 14. See id. at 133. 
 15. Reservations to CEDAW, U.N. WOMEN, http://www.un.org/ 
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2014). 
 16. CEDAW, supra note 2, at 16.  
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(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including 
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against 
women; 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal 
basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals 
and other public institutions the effective protection of women 
against any act of discrimination; 
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination 
against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions 
shall act in conformity with this obligation; 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women by any person, organization or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify 
or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which 
constitute discrimination against women; 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute 
discrimination against women.17 
In short, Article 2 requires states to undertake—without 
delay—certain policy measures to embody equality through their 
constitution or appropriate legislation; establish equal protection of 
women; refrain from any practice of discrimination; take all 
measures to change laws, regulations, customs, and practices that 
discriminate against women; and repeal any penal provisions that 
discriminate against women.18 
Discrimination against women is defined broadly as  
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.19 
Article 16 tackles the controversial area of family relations. 
Article 16 provides: 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of 
men and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
                                                     
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent; 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its 
dissolution; 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of 
their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases 
the interests of the children shall be paramount; 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number 
and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, 
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights; 
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, 
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions 
where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount; 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right 
to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition 
of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration. 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and 
all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a 
minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an 
official registry compulsory.20 
In short, Article 16 regulates marriage and divorce as well as 
rights regarding children, work, and property.21 “Article 16 is the 
most reserved substantive article in the Convention.”22 The number 
of reservations to this provision—and the paucity of withdrawals of 
such reservations—indicate that the rights enumerated here are 
fraught with controversy. The controversial nature of this provision 
was known at the drafting stage.23 Reservations to Article 16 often 
include explanations based on Islamic sharia.24  
B. Object and Purpose of the Treaty 
Under CEDAW, as well as under the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, a reservation is impermissible if it “is 
                                                     
 20. Id. at 20. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Marsha Freeman, Article 16, in CEDAW COMMENTARY, supra note 10, 
at 409, 441. 
 23. Connors, supra note 10, at 573. 
 24. Id. 
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incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”25 The 
Committee has indicated that both Articles 2 and 16 are “core 
provisions.”26 In particular, Article 2 is central to the object and 
purpose of the treaty.27 According to the Committee, “States parties 
which ratify the Convention do so because they agree that 
discrimination against women in all its forms should be condemned 
and that the strategies set out in article 2, subparagraphs (a) to (g), 
should be implemented by States parties to eliminate it.”28 
Similarly, the Committee has stated that “reservations to article 
16, whether lodged for national, traditional, religious or cultural 
reasons, are incompatible with the Convention and therefore 
impermissible.”29 Yet, the number of reservations to these articles—
and perhaps the state of inequality for women worldwide—implies 
that some countries may ratify CEDAW without actually believing in 
its substance. 
The Committee has recognized this problem.30 It has indicated 
that reservations to CEDAW show the state’s unwillingness to accept 
women’s rights and ensure the continued subjugation of women in 
that country.31  
Reservations to articles 2 and 16 perpetuate the myth of women’s 
inferiority and reinforce the inequalities in the lives of millions of women 
throughout the world. They continue to be treated in both public and 
private life as inferior to men, and to suffer greater violations of their 
rights in every sphere of their lives.32 
C. Blanket Reservations 
In addition to reservations to Articles 2 and 16, among others, 
some States parties issue blanket reservations. For example, take 
Saudi Arabia, which ratified CEDAW in 2000.33 It ratified with the 
                                                     
 25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, at 337; see 
CEDAW, supra note 2, at 23. 
 26. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 18th Sess., 19th Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 6, 1998, June 22-July 10, 1998, at 47, 
U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1998). 
 27. Id. at 49. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Even if empirical proof is lacking that reservations decrease women’s 
rights, the Committee is clearly concerned about reservations to Articles 2 and 16, 
whether regarding the potential effect or symbolic import. Id. at 47.  
 31. Id. at 49. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Participants, Declarations, and Reservations, supra note 3. 
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reservation, “‘[i]n case of contradiction between any term of the 
Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under 
the obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the 
Convention.’”34 Similarly, Mauritania agreed to be bound to the 
treaty “in each and every one of its parts which are not contrary to 
Islamic Sharia and are in accordance with our Constitution.”35 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifies that a 
state may not agree to be bound by only part of the treaty, unless the 
treaty or the other contracting states permit it.36 While few States 
parties to CEDAW formally claim to be ratifying only part of the 
treaty, as Mauritania does, the broadest reservations approach this: 
states ratify with the caveat that they will adhere to only those parts 
of the treaty that are consistent with their internal laws, religion, or 
culture. 
The Committee has called on States parties to withdraw such 
reservations.37 Other States parties have also objected to such 
reservations. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, an objection by another state party will not prevent the 
treaty from coming into force between those two states unless the 
objector so specifies.38 While many States parties have objected to 
blanket reservations and to reservations to Articles 2 and 16 (among 
others),39 they have not attempted to block the treaty’s entry into 
force. 
Take, for example, Austria’s objection to Mauritania’s blanket 
reservation. Austria noted that it “raises doubts as to the degree of 
commitment assumed by Mauritania” and recalled that incompatible 
reservations are not permitted.40 But Austria concluded that its 
objection “does not preclude the entry into force in its entirety of the 
Convention between Mauritania and Austria.”41 
                                                     
 34. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: 
Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Saudi Arabia, ¶ 3, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SAU/2 (Mar. 29, 2007). 
 35. Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, supra note 6. 
 36. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, at 336. 
 37. See, e.g., Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, 11th Sess., Jan. 20-30, 1992, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/47/38; GAOR, 47th 
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1992).  
 38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, at 337. 
 39. Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, supra note 6. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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The typical way of dealing with impermissible reservations—
based on other States parties’ objections—does not seem well suited 
to CEDAW or human rights treaties in general. Multilateral human 
rights treaties are not aimed at protecting Austrian citizens from 
Mauritania, for example. Rather, human rights treaties are most often 
aimed at ensuring protections of citizens in their own country. As 
another treaty body said, human rights treaties “are not a web of 
inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the 
endowment of individuals with rights.”42 The Human Rights 
Committee, interpreting reservations to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, concluded that “reservations should not 
systematically reduce the obligations undertaken only to those 
presently existing in less demanding standards of domestic law.”43   
Thus, the Committee has concluded that reservations to 
CEDAW Articles 2 and 16, and overbroad reservations, are 
impermissible. But there is no enforcement mechanism in CEDAW, 
and the general principles of international law that rely on interstate 
reciprocity are inapposite.44 As a result, the Committee is left to 
repeatedly request States parties to remove such reservations, either 
in its general comments or in responses to individual state reports. 
II. CASE STUDY: SINGAPORE 
This brings us to one example that may illustrate the varied 
ways reservations may be used by States parties. First, broad 
reservations may directly impact the implementation of CEDAW or 
at least send a message that the state does not accept the full 
enforcement of women’s human rights. Second, the partial 
withdrawal of a reservation may show the role of the treaty in 
bringing change to some countries. Third, the maintenance of a 
possibly unnecessary reservation may illustrate how treaty 
reservations are used for internal political reasons. 
The evolution of Singapore’s reservations and the 
implementation of the treaty also show how CEDAW can play out 
on the ground. I will first outline Singapore’s initial reservation and 
the reaction by other States parties and the Committee. Second, I will 
discuss the changes in state law and the participation of civil society 
                                                     
 42. Rep of the Human Rights Comm., 52d Sess., 53d Sess., 54th Sess., Oct. 
7-Nov. 4, 1994, Mar. 20-Apr. 7, 1995, July 3-28, 1995, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/50/40, 
Annex V; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1996). 
 43. Id. at 124.  
 44. Id. at 123. 
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in using CEDAW to push for reforms. This culminated in the partial 
withdraw of one key reservation. But limitations still remain, and the 
fight continues for reforms that will enable the full removal of 
reservations. It may be, however, that the reasons for maintenance of 
one key reservation are more related to internal politics45 than 
CEDAW implementation. 
Singapore acceded to the treaty in 1995.46 In addition to a 
reservation explicitly allowed by CEDAW regarding settlement of 
disputes,47 it attached the following reservations: 
(1) In the context of Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society 
and the need to respect the freedom of minorities to practise their religious 
and personal laws, the Republic of Singapore reserves the right not to 
apply the provisions of articles 2 and 16 where compliance with these 
provisions would be contrary to their religious or personal laws. 
(2) Singapore is geographically one of the smallest independent countries 
in the world and one of the most densely populated. The Republic of 
Singapore accordingly reserves the right to apply such laws and conditions 
governing the entry into, stay in, employment of and departure from its 
territory of those who do not have the right under the laws of Singapore to 
enter and remain indefinitely in Singapore and to the conferment, 
acquisitions and loss of citizenship of women who have acquired such 
citizenship by marriage and of children born outside Singapore. 
(3) Singapore interprets article 11, paragraph 1 in the light of the 
provisions of article 4, paragraph 2 as not precluding prohibitions, 
restrictions or conditions on the employment of women in certain areas, or 
on work done by them where this is considered necessary or desirable to 
protect the health and safety of women or the human foetus, including 
such prohibitions, restrictions or conditions imposed in consequence of 
other international obligations of Singapore and considers that legislation 
in respect of article 11 is unnecessary for the minority of women who do 
not fall within the ambit of Singapore’s employment legislation.48 
Although there have been some interesting developments with regard 
to other reservations, I will focus here on reservation 1.  
A. Reservation to Articles 2 and 16 and Objections Thereto 
Singapore’s first reservation is a blanket reservation to Articles 
2 and 16: 
                                                     
 45. Freeman, supra note 1. 
 46. Participants, Declarations, and Reservations, supra note 3. 
 47. CEDAW, supra note 2, at 23 (allowing opt out of referral of dispute 
over interpretation of convention to International Court of Justice). 
 48. Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, supra note 6. 
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(1) In the context of Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society 
and the need to respect the freedom of minorities to practise their religious 
and personal laws, the Republic of Singapore reserves the right not to 
apply the provisions of articles 2 and 16 where compliance with these 
provisions would be contrary to their religious or personal laws.49 
Several states object to this reservation. For example, Finland 
objects to this reservation on several grounds.50 First, the general 
reference to religious or personal laws is too vague and raises doubts 
as to the commitment to adhere to the treaty.51 Second, states 
generally cannot invoke internal law to justify non-adherence to 
treaty obligations.52 Finland concludes that the reservations are 
impermissible and “devoid of legal effect.”53 Denmark and Sweden 
make similar objections.54 In the same vein, Norway objects that “a 
reservation by which a State party limits its responsibilities under the 
Convention by invoking general principles of internal law may create 
doubts about the commitments of the reserving State to the object 
and purpose of the Convention and, moreover, contribute to 
undermine the basis of international treaty law.”55 The Netherlands 
objects that “the reservation under (1) is incompatible with the 
purpose of the Convention.”56 
This sort of reservation shows how a state party can essentially 
opt out of taking on new obligations under the treaty. As a result, 
there is a lacuna in treaty rights that allows for the state to continue 
to violate women’s human rights without violating the treaty, as it 
adheres to it. This is not to say that Singapore is the worst of the 
worst when it comes to protecting women’s rights.57 But its 
reservation 1 exemplifies the sort of reservation that either in real or 
symbolic effect facilitates a lack of respect for the full panoply of 
women’s rights enshrined in the treaty. 
                                                     
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Thanks to Marsha Freeman and Neil Englehart for emphasizing that this 
point needs to be explicit. Freeman, supra note 1; Englehart, supra note 12.  
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B. Reports 1–3 to the Committee 
Under CEDAW, States parties are supposed to submit a report 
to the Committee within one year of entry into force and typically 
every four years after that.58 As is often the case, Singapore 
submitted its initial report late, in November of 1999, and submitted 
its second report in May of 2001.59 In the Committee’s concluding 
comments on these reports, it found that Singapore’s reservations 
“impede full implementation of the Convention.”60 The Committee 
noted that some reforms had already been introduced into the law 
that allows Muslims to practice their personal and religious laws, and 
urged that further reforms be made.61 It stressed “that [A]rticles 2 and 
16 are the very essence of obligations under the Convention.”62 
In 2007, the Committee considered Singapore’s next report.63 
By that time, Singapore had withdrawn the reservation related to 
Article 9 (citizenship by descent), but maintained its most 
objectionable reservation to Articles 2 and 16.64 The Committee 
therefore “reiterate[d] its deep concern” about the reservation to 
Articles 2 and 16 and that it considered it “contrary to the object and 
purpose” of the treaty.65 It urged Singapore to consult with all 
stakeholders to revise the law as necessary to withdraw the 
reservation.66 At the same time, it asked Singapore to include an 
analysis of the reservation’s “impact on different groups of 
women.”67 This may have inadvertently sent a signal that there was 
no real expectation that the reservation would be fully withdrawn by 
                                                     
 58. See CEDAW, supra note 2, at 22. 
 59. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: 
Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Singapore, at 4, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/SGP/2 (May 3, 2001). 
 60. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 24th Sess., 25th Sess., Jan. 15-Feb. 2, 2001, July 2-20, 2001, at 53, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/38; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (2001). 
 61. Id. at 52-54. 
 62. Id. at 53. 
 63. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Singapore, 39th Sess., July 23-Aug. 10, 2007, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/3 (Aug. 10, 2007). 
 64. Id. ¶ 5. 
 65. Id. ¶ 11. 
 66. Id. ¶ 12. 
 67. Id. 
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the time of the next report. On the other hand, the Committee offered 
specific suggestions about how to work toward compliance with 
Article 2 and how to “remove inconsistencies between civil law and 
sharia law.”68 
C. Most Recent Report and Shadow Reports 
The government of Singapore filed its next report in April of 
2009.69 It reported progress, such as the withdrawal of the reservation 
to Article 9 based on a constitutional amendment (re: citizenship) 
and changes in legislation.70 The government monitors compliance 
with CEDAW via the Inter-Ministry Committee, which also works 
with civil society.71 The government announced a partial withdrawal 
of the reservation to Articles 2 and 16 in July 2011, based on internal 
reforms of sharia law and practice.72 In particular, the minimum age 
for most Muslim marriages was raised to eighteen and changes were 
made to Muslim inheritance law.73 But a reservation against “specific 
elements of articles 2 and 16” was deemed necessary based on “the 
need for the Muslim minority community to practice their family and 
personal laws.”74 
Various organizations involved in CEDAW issues in Singapore 
provided “shadow reports” to the Committee. For example, the 
Singapore Council of Women’s Organisations submitted a report to 
the Committee for the 49th session.75 This nongovernmental 
                                                     
 68. Id. ¶ 16. The Committee also raised specific concerns regarding the 
narrow definition of trafficking, inadequate legal protection of foreign domestic 
workers, lack of criminalization of marital rape, and employment discrimination 
issues. Id. ¶¶ 21-31. 
 69. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: 
Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Singapore, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SGP/4 
(Apr. 3, 2009). 
 70. Id. at 2. 
 71. See MDM Halimah Yacob, Minister of State for Cmty. Dev., Youth & 
Sports & Leader of the Sing. Delegation to the 49th CEDAW Session, Remarks at 
U.N. Headquarters ¶¶ 5, 7 (July 22, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/statements/Singapore_CEDAW4
9.pdf). 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. 
 73. Id. ¶ 27. 
 74. Id. ¶ 28. 
 75. SING. COUNCIL OF WOMEN’S ORGS., CEDAW SHADOW REPORT: 
NATIONAL NGO COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON CEDAW (49TH SESSION) 
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organization (NGO) applauded progress, such as the change in 
citizenship law allowing the lifting of reservation to Article 9, partial 
abolition of marital rape immunity, increased involvement of women 
in politics and public life, improvement in wages for women, and 
changes regarding the age of marriage and other family law 
provisions.76 It advocated that the government consider changing its 
reservations to Articles 2 and 16, to maintain only a partial 
reservation to Article 2(f) and Article 16(1)(a) and (c).77 It argued 
that only narrow reservations would be necessary given the current 
reforms to the law and that further reforms could be made to enable 
the withdrawal of all reservations.78  
The advocacy group AWARE argued for the same partial 
withdrawal of the reservation.79 Specifically, Article 2(f) commits a 
country to take measures to modify or abolish laws, regulations, 
customs, or practices that discriminate against women.80 A 
reservation to this would allow Singaporean law to continue to carve 
out an exception for certain Islamic practices.81 AWARE noted that 
this should be a temporary measure because Article 2 “is the raison 
d’être for CEDAW.”82 The specific practices that would need to be 
changed include practices privileging men as to polygamy, 
inheritance rights, marriage rights, and divorce rights.83 The other 
provisions of Article 2, according to the government’s own positions, 
are met—meaning no reservation to them is necessary.84 
As to Article 16, AWARE noted that Singapore already has 
laws that ensure most of these rights.85 The exception is 
subparagraphs 1(a) and (c), which cover equal rights to enter 
marriage and equal rights and responsibilities during marriage or its 
dissolution.86 AWARE noted that some changes had already been 
                                                                                                                
(2011), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/ 
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 76. Id. at 10. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 14. 
 79. ASS’N OF WOMEN ACTION & RESEARCH, CEDAW SHADOW REPORT 6 
(2011), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/ 
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 80. Id. at 28. 
 81. Id. at 7. 
 82. Id. at 30-31. 
 83. Id. at 30. 
 84. Id. at 31. 
 85. Id. at 139. 
 86. Id. at 7. 
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made to conform to Article 16; thus, the government’s refusal to 
drop the blanket reservation was invalid.87 It noted that the marriage 
age for girls was raised and that other Muslim countries have 
removed similar reservations to Article 16(2).88 
AWARE recognized that Article 16 (1)(a) and (c) might 
“interfere” with rights granted to Muslims under the Administration 
of Muslim Law Act (AMLA).89 It therefore argued that the 
government should modify its reservation to address only these 
Articles.90 
D. Partial Withdrawal of Reservation to Articles 2 and 16 
If the government had followed this advice, then the partial 
withdrawal of reservations to Articles 2 and 16 would be a more 
significant victory for women’s human rights in Singapore. Instead, 
the government’s action seems to be an incremental change at best, 
at least on paper. 
Recall that Singapore’s original reservation provides: 
(1) In the context of Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society 
and the need to respect the freedom of minorities to practise their religious 
and personal laws, the Republic of Singapore reserves the right not to 
apply the provisions of articles 2 and 16 where compliance with these 
provisions would be contrary to their religious or personal laws.91 
Singapore stated that it would modify this reservation “so as to 
achieve a more complete application of the Convention.”92 Singapore 
changed the wording to “reserves the right not to apply the 
provisions of article 2, paragraphs (a) to (f), and article 16, 
paragraphs 1(a), 1(c), 1(h), and article 16, paragraph 2, where 
compliance with these provisions would be contrary to their religious 
or personal laws.”93 
Note that most of Article 2 is still included in the reservation. 
The beginning of Article 2 is apparently in force, but it simply 
condemns discrimination, leaving it to subparagraphs (a)–(g) to 
actually implement policies to end discrimination against women. 
Singapore still reserves the right to ignore (a)–(f) to the extent they 
                                                     
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 141-42. 
 89. Id. at 145. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, supra note 6. 
 92. Participants, Declarations, and Reservations, supra note 3. 
 93. Id. 
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are incompatible with internal laws. The only “undertaking” that is in 
force is subparagraph (g), the repeal of penal provisions that 
discriminate against women. Since the basis for the reservation is 
“religious or personal” laws, it seems unlikely that Article 2(g) was 
relevant in the first place.94 Therefore, the partial withdrawal of the 
reservation as to Article 2 is not a significant improvement. 
With regard to Article 16, Singapore did more than maintain 
the reservations to subparagraphs 1(a) and (c), as predicted by the 
shadow reports. It also retained a reservation to (1)(h),95 which grants 
equal property rights to spouses.96 Moreover, it reserved the right to 
allow child marriages, apparently because recent changes raising the 
age of marriage to eighteen had a loophole: at least until 2009, a girl 
below the age of eighteen but over the age of puberty could be 
married with special permission of religious authorities.97 AWARE 
had argued, unsuccessfully, that a reservation for this minor 
exception is unnecessary and misleading, given that the number of 
such marriages is small.98 
The Committee reacted to Singapore’s partial withdrawal by 
reiterating that the remaining reservations to Articles 2 and 16 “are 
impermissible since these articles are fundamental to the 
implementation of all the other provisions of the Convention.”99 It 
noted Singapore’s statement that it is considering further review of 
its reservations and urged it to withdraw the reservations to Articles 
2 and 16, “which are contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention, within a concrete time frame.”100 
Based on the shadow reports submitted to the Committee, it 
seems that Singapore has a vibrant civil society attuned to CEDAW 
and its processes. The Convention seems to have helped spark 
reforms in some areas. Yet for two key provisions, related to policy 
measures and marriage and family life, the advocacy groups were 
less successful. Although Singapore changed its blanket reservation 
to a more targeted reservation specifying the relevant provisions, its 
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reservation still encompasses almost the entirety of Article 2. 
Moreover, it arguably covers more of Article 16 than is necessary, as 
least according to advocacy groups.101  
The partial withdrawal can be used to demonstrate two 
potential phenomena. First, it may show the effectiveness of 
CEDAW advocacy, by both the Committee and civil society. 
Second, it may represent states’ use of CEDAW to make political 
points. Here, Singapore may be maintaining the reservation in order 
to score political points at home with the Muslim minority.102 If the 
NGO reports are accurate and the remaining parts of the reservation 
are not necessary in light of Singaporean law, then political 
motivations may explain the partial—rather than total—withdrawal 
here. Singapore would certainly not be the first state to use treaty 
mechanisms to send messages to internal constituents.103  
CONCLUSION 
The NGO group AWARE has argued that Singapore’s 
“reservations are stopping us from passing legislation, for instance in 
the field of employment law, to protect women against 
discrimination.”104 This is, of course, the opposite of the intent of the 
CEDAW system. Singapore’s violations may be relatively minor in 
comparison to the most egregious abuses against women worldwide. 
Nonetheless, internal actors believe that the reservations do have a 
direct, negative impact on the rights of women in Singapore. 
Ratification of the treaty is supposed to improve women’s 
rights across the board. As this brief examination of reservations has 
shown, however, the impact of joining CEDAW can be stunted by 
overbroad reservations. These reservations may be general, 
purporting to limit obligations under the treaty only to those already 
granted under internal or religious law. Other reservations, like those 
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of Singapore, may be more specific but may still have the effect of 
limiting the state party’s commitments under the treaty. If 
reservations are maintained for political reasons, there is still a 
message being sent to women that their rights are subject to at least 
symbolic degradation for political gain. 
The symbolism of treaty reservations can be powerful, in 
addition to their potential impact on women’s human rights. The 
United States has still not ratified CEDAW, but even presidents who 
supported ratification have proposed reservations to the treaty.105 If 
the United States does ratify CEDAW with its usual package of 
reservations, understandings, and declarations, it will be following 
the poor example of states that ratify a treaty while professing no 
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